Thursday, October 8, 2026

India Should Build the Foundations AI Will Need

India's next software opportunity may not be to write more applications for other people's platforms. It may be to build the open foundations that both humans and AI agents will use to create the next generation of applications.

For decades, India's software industry has demonstrated an extraordinary ability to take specifications, business requirements and existing technologies and turn them into working software at scale.

That model created an enormous industry.

But artificial intelligence is beginning to change the economics of software development.

The important question is therefore not simply whether AI will replace software engineers.

A better question is:

Which parts of software development become cheap when AI can write code, and which parts become more valuable?

The answer may be pointing toward an opportunity that India has not pursued aggressively enough: foundational software.

Instead of competing with AI to write another application, Indian engineers could increasingly build the libraries, engines, protocols, databases, media frameworks, graphics systems, APIs, developer tools and machine interfaces that AI itself will depend upon.

In other words:

Don't compete with AI at typing code. Build what AI needs underneath it.

The AI Coding Revolution Has a Hidden Limitation

The recent progress of AI coding systems is genuinely impressive.

Modern coding agents can read repositories, modify multiple files, run commands, inspect errors, write tests and iterate on implementations. AI can already produce surprisingly sophisticated applications from relatively simple instructions.

But there is an important distinction between writing software and having reliable software foundations available to build upon.

Suppose someone asks an AI:

"Create a reminder application that schedules notifications, stores reminders locally, survives a reboot and allows users to edit or delete reminders."

This is a reasonably approachable problem because modern platforms already provide many of the required building blocks.

The AI can combine a database, notification framework, scheduling system, user interface toolkit and operating-system APIs.

The result may still contain bugs. The architecture may need improvement. Dependencies may conflict. The application may require considerable debugging.

But the fundamental primitives already exist.

Now ask the AI:

"Build a reliable cross-platform video conversion engine that accepts arbitrary video files, decodes multiple codecs, handles audio and video streams, resizes frames, converts formats, encodes the result efficiently, preserves synchronization, muxes the output correctly and works across modern mobile hardware."

The problem changes completely.

The AI is no longer merely assembling mature components. It is suddenly forced to understand an enormous amount of low-level engineering.

Video processing involves codecs, containers, timestamps, buffers, hardware acceleration, pixel formats, audio pipelines, memory management, threading, synchronization and platform-specific behaviour.

Android's own MediaCodec, for example, is explicitly described by Google as a low-level interface to encoder and decoder components and is normally used together with other multimedia components such as MediaExtractor, MediaMuxer, MediaSync and Surface.

This is precisely where the difference between "AI can code" and "the ecosystem has good foundations" becomes visible.

My Own Experiments Pointed to the Same Problem

This is not merely a theoretical observation.

When I experimented with having frontier AI models build Android applications, relatively conventional applications were feasible.

A reminder application could be constructed using Android's existing scheduling, notification, database and UI infrastructure.

But when the task moved toward video conversion and media processing, things became much harder.

The problem was not necessarily that the AI could not write Kotlin or Java.

The problem was that the required abstraction was much weaker.

There was no single clean, modern, universally convenient "VideoEngine.convert(input, output, settings)" foundation that an AI could simply understand and reliably invoke.

Instead, the developer had to deal with lower-level interfaces and a large number of compatibility and implementation details.

This experience reveals something important about the future of AI-assisted programming.

AI becomes dramatically more powerful when difficult engineering problems have already been converted into reliable abstractions.

The AI can then assemble those abstractions.

This suggests that the value of software engineering will increasingly move toward the layers where those abstractions are created.

From Writing Applications to Building Digital Infrastructure

Imagine that somebody creates a mature, well-tested, open-source video foundation.

It provides:

  • video decoding
  • video encoding
  • audio decoding and encoding
  • format conversion
  • resizing
  • cropping
  • frame extraction
  • subtitle handling
  • metadata handling
  • hardware acceleration
  • streaming
  • container manipulation
  • progress reporting
  • error handling
  • cross-platform APIs
  • command-line interfaces
  • language bindings
  • machine-readable documentation

Suddenly, building a video application becomes much easier.

An AI agent might only need to invoke something like:

convert_video(
    input="movie.mp4",
    output="compressed.mp4",
    codec="h265",
    resolution="1080p",
    quality=75
)

The difficult engineering has not disappeared.

It has simply been moved downward into a reusable foundation.

That foundation can then support thousands of applications.

This is the economic difference between selling implementation and building infrastructure.

The New Software Stack May Have Four Layers

The software industry has traditionally been understood roughly like this:

  1. hardware
  2. operating systems
  3. libraries and frameworks
  4. applications

AI introduces another layer of interaction.

A future stack could increasingly look like:

  1. Hardware — CPUs, GPUs, NPUs, storage, networking and accelerators.
  2. System foundations — operating systems, drivers, compilers, databases, graphics, codecs and networking.
  3. Agent-ready foundations — APIs, tools, schemas, documentation, state inspection, permissions and machine-readable interfaces.
  4. Applications — products assembled increasingly by humans and AI agents.

The fourth layer may become progressively cheaper to produce.

The second and third layers could therefore become strategically more important.

AI-Controlled Software Is Different From AI-Generated Software

This distinction is particularly important.

There are at least three different things happening under the broad label of "AI coding".

1. AI-generated code

The AI writes the implementation.

This is what most people think about when they hear "AI coding".

2. AI-controlled software

The software already exists, but an AI agent can operate it through reliable commands.

For example:

create_rectangle(x, y, width, height)

create_circle(x, y, radius)

boolean_intersection(object_a, object_b)

export_image(format="png")

The AI does not need to understand how a geometric intersection algorithm works.

The graphics engine does.

The AI only needs to understand what the operation means and when to use it.

3. AI-generated content

The AI itself generates the resulting image, video, text, sound or other content.

These are very different technological models.

And the second model could become enormously important.

It means existing professional software can become agent-addressable.

The Agentic API Is Becoming a New Kind of Interface

Traditional APIs were designed primarily for programmers.

An engineer reads the documentation, understands the parameters and writes code against the interface.

AI agents introduce a new consumer for APIs.

The interface now needs to be understandable not only by humans but also by machines that reason over descriptions, schemas, examples and available operations.

This is already visible in emerging standards such as the Model Context Protocol (MCP).

MCP defines primitives including tools, resources and prompts. Tools allow models to invoke executable functions, while resources provide structured contextual information.

The significance is larger than one protocol.

It represents a shift in how software can be exposed.

A database does not necessarily have to be operated exclusively through a graphical interface.

A graphics editor does not necessarily have to be operated exclusively through menus and mouse clicks.

A spreadsheet does not necessarily have to be operated exclusively through cells.

A video editor does not necessarily have to be operated exclusively through a timeline.

The underlying capabilities can increasingly become tools that an AI agent can discover and invoke.

That makes the quality of the underlying API extremely important.

Documentation Becomes Part of the Software

This may be one of the most underestimated consequences of agentic software.

Documentation has traditionally been treated as something humans read.

In an agentic environment, documentation increasingly becomes part of the machine interface.

A good foundation should explain:

  • what each operation does
  • what inputs are accepted
  • what outputs are returned
  • what errors can occur
  • what state is changed
  • whether an operation is reversible
  • whether an operation is destructive
  • what permissions are required
  • what performance characteristics exist
  • what examples demonstrate correct usage
  • what combinations of operations are valid
  • what the agent should do when something fails

Modern MCP development is already moving in this direction. The protocol exposes tools with descriptions and schemas, while its broader ecosystem is developing ways to communicate server instructions and agent skills alongside tools and resources.

In other words:

The documentation of tomorrow may be executable knowledge.

This makes extremely detailed documentation an economic asset rather than merely a developer convenience.

What Should Indian Engineers Build?

If this thesis is correct, India should not simply ask:

"Which applications can we build using AI?"

We should also ask:

"Which difficult software capabilities could we turn into reusable foundations?"

There is an enormous list.

Tier 1: Simple Foundations

These may not sound glamorous, but they could provide excellent training grounds.

  • notification engines
  • scheduling engines
  • document generation
  • PDF creation and manipulation
  • OCR
  • text extraction
  • speech-to-text
  • text-to-speech
  • file conversion
  • archive management
  • image resizing and transformation
  • metadata extraction
  • search libraries
  • local indexing
  • configuration management

These are not necessarily billion-dollar products individually.

That is not the point.

The point is to turn difficult recurring engineering problems into reliable reusable components.

Tier 2: Media and Data Foundations

Once engineers become comfortable with these systems, the complexity can increase.

  • audio engines
  • video engines
  • image processing engines
  • document rendering engines
  • database engines
  • search and indexing systems
  • data transformation pipelines
  • compression libraries
  • streaming systems
  • networking libraries
  • file-system abstractions
  • synchronisation engines
  • local-first databases

These are much deeper engineering problems.

They require understanding memory, concurrency, algorithms, operating systems, storage, networking and hardware.

They are also exactly the kinds of foundations that thousands of applications could reuse.

Tier 3: Advanced Foundations

Then comes the genuinely difficult territory.

  • graphics engines
  • rendering systems
  • physics engines
  • simulation frameworks
  • compilers
  • language runtimes
  • cryptographic libraries
  • distributed databases
  • distributed storage
  • networking stacks
  • virtualisation
  • container infrastructure
  • operating-system components
  • GPU compute frameworks
  • machine-learning runtimes

These are not ordinary application-development projects.

They require engineers who understand the machine underneath the abstraction.

And Then There Is Hardware

This is where the opportunity becomes particularly interesting for India.

The boundary between software and hardware is becoming increasingly important as AI workloads spread across CPUs, GPUs, NPUs and specialised accelerators.

Open hardware projects and open instruction-set architectures such as RISC-V provide another possible direction.

An engineer who understands operating systems, compilers, runtimes and hardware interfaces can eventually work much closer to the machine itself.

That could mean:

  • RISC-V software stacks
  • device drivers
  • embedded operating systems
  • accelerator runtimes
  • GPU software
  • NPU runtimes
  • compiler backends
  • hardware abstraction layers
  • firmware
  • verification tools
  • simulation environments
  • EDA tooling

This is particularly relevant to India's emerging interest in open silicon.

If India eventually wants to participate seriously in open CPUs, NPUs, GPUs and specialised accelerators, it will need software engineers who can cross the boundary between software and hardware.

The future opportunity is therefore not simply software versus hardware.

It is software deeply integrated with hardware.

The "Daily-Wage Programmer" Problem

There is an uncomfortable economic dimension to all of this.

Large parts of the global software-services economy are structured around selling engineering capacity.

A customer has a requirement.

A company assigns engineers.

The engineers implement the requirement.

The customer pays for the work.

The engineers move to the next project.

There is nothing inherently wrong with this model. It created enormous employment and helped establish India as one of the world's major technology centres.

But economically, it has a limitation.

The value is repeatedly tied to human implementation hours.

AI directly attacks the economics of repetitive implementation.

If an AI agent can produce in one hour what previously required ten engineers for a week, the market value of simply supplying those implementation hours will inevitably come under pressure.

That does not mean software engineering disappears.

It means the location of value changes.

Instead of asking:

"How many programmers can India provide?"

We should increasingly ask:

"How many foundational technologies can Indian engineers create and maintain?"

Foundational Software Is Digital Capital

A reusable software foundation behaves differently from a consulting project.

A consulting project may serve one customer.

A foundation can serve thousands.

A library written once can be integrated into hundreds of products.

A codec can be used by countless applications.

A database can support millions of users.

A graphics engine can power an entire ecosystem.

An open protocol can become infrastructure.

A compiler can support an entire hardware architecture.

This is why foundational software should be understood as digital capital.

It is not simply code.

It is accumulated engineering knowledge converted into a reusable machine.

Open Source Makes the Opportunity Even More Interesting

India does not necessarily need to own every foundation commercially.

Open source changes the equation.

An Indian engineering team could build an open-source foundation and allow companies around the world to build upon it.

Revenue could then emerge from:

  • commercial support
  • enterprise editions
  • hosting
  • integration
  • certification
  • hardware partnerships
  • consulting
  • specialised implementations
  • managed services
  • commercial extensions

But the underlying technical asset remains available to the ecosystem.

This creates a very different relationship between Indian engineers and global technology.

Instead of merely implementing somebody else's platform, Indian engineers can help create the platforms that others implement against.

India Already Has the Scale

The interesting thing is that India does not need to start from zero.

India already possesses an enormous technology workforce and a large software-services ecosystem.

NASSCOM's recent industry estimates put India's technology-industry workforce at millions of employees, while engineering R&D, GCCs and digital engineering have become increasingly important parts of the ecosystem. Its 2025 strategic review estimated FY2025 technology-industry revenue at more than $282 billion including hardware and projected the industry toward $300 billion in FY2026.

The question is therefore not whether India has enough engineers.

The question is what those engineers are encouraged to build.

There is a huge difference between having millions of people capable of writing software and having a large community capable of maintaining foundational software.

The second requires a different culture.

We Need More Engineers Who Understand the Machine

The foundational engineer of the future should probably be comfortable moving across multiple layers.

They should understand:

  • algorithms
  • data structures
  • memory
  • concurrency
  • operating systems
  • networking
  • file formats
  • compilers
  • databases
  • graphics
  • hardware interfaces
  • performance profiling
  • testing
  • security
  • API design
  • documentation

Languages such as C, C++ and Rust become particularly useful in this world, not because higher-level languages disappear, but because somebody eventually has to understand what is happening underneath them.

And AI itself becomes a powerful assistant for these engineers.

An engineer who understands a system can ask AI to generate implementations, explore alternatives, write tests, inspect code and produce documentation.

The engineer provides the architectural understanding.

The AI provides enormous amounts of implementation leverage.

This could actually make foundational engineering more productive, rather than less relevant.

The Goal Is Not to Eliminate Application Developers

This argument should not be misunderstood.

India should not suddenly tell millions of application developers to abandon their careers and become kernel developers.

That would be neither realistic nor desirable.

Application development will remain enormous.

People will always need products designed around particular businesses, industries, cultures and human needs.

What should change is the proportion of effort spent reinventing low-level capabilities.

If a mature open-source foundation already exists, developers should use it.

If it does not exist, that absence may represent an opportunity.

The application developer of the future may therefore become much more productive.

Instead of spending three months building an internal document engine, they might spend three days integrating a mature one.

Instead of writing a custom media pipeline, they might call a standard media foundation.

Instead of manually integrating dozens of APIs, an AI agent might orchestrate them.

This means foundational engineering does not destroy application development.

It makes application development cheaper and more powerful.

Universities Should Teach the Layers Below the App

This also suggests a change in engineering education.

Students should certainly learn Python, JavaScript, Java, Kotlin and modern AI tooling.

But they should also be encouraged to build things such as:

  • a small database
  • a file system
  • a compiler
  • a network protocol
  • a simple operating-system component
  • a graphics renderer
  • a media pipeline
  • a search engine
  • a compression algorithm
  • a small virtual machine
  • a RISC-V emulator
  • a hardware simulator

These projects teach something that framework-based application development often hides:

what the computer is actually doing.

Once an engineer understands that, AI becomes an accelerator rather than a replacement for understanding.

India Could Build a National Foundation Software Ecosystem

There is an even larger possibility.

India could deliberately identify a few hundred important open-source foundations and treat them as strategic digital infrastructure.

Not every project needs government ownership.

Not every project needs a giant company.

But India could create funding, fellowships, university programmes, industry partnerships and long-term maintenance programmes around strategically important open-source projects.

Consider a hypothetical Indian foundation stack:

Layer Examples
Basic utilities Files, scheduling, notifications, archives, conversion
Documents PDF, office formats, rendering, OCR
Media Audio, video, codecs, streaming
Data Databases, indexing, search, synchronisation
Graphics Rendering, 2D/3D, GPU compute
AI infrastructure Inference runtimes, model formats, accelerator APIs
Systems Compilers, runtimes, operating-system components
Networking Protocols, distributed systems, secure communication
Hardware Drivers, firmware, RISC-V, accelerators, simulation

Each layer would make the next layer easier.

That is how an ecosystem becomes self-reinforcing.

The First Foundations May Look Boring

There is another lesson here.

The first generation of Indian foundational software does not need to be spectacular.

A reliable notification library may be more useful than another flashy AI application.

A truly excellent PDF engine may quietly become part of thousands of applications.

A robust open-source video engine may save developers around the world enormous amounts of engineering effort.

A high-quality document renderer may become infrastructure for countless AI agents.

A well-designed database API may become invisible infrastructure used by applications nobody has imagined yet.

This is how foundational technologies often work.

Their success is measured by how many things can be built without thinking about them anymore.

AI May Actually Increase the Value of Good Foundations

This is perhaps the most important conclusion.

It is tempting to assume that AI makes software less valuable.

But another interpretation is possible.

AI makes well-abstracted software more valuable.

If an AI agent can discover a capability, understand its inputs and outputs, invoke it safely, inspect the result and recover from failure, that capability becomes a building block for automated software creation.

One foundation can therefore become part of thousands or millions of future AI-generated workflows.

The leverage becomes enormous.

This creates a positive feedback loop:

  1. Engineers build a reliable foundation.
  2. The foundation receives excellent documentation and APIs.
  3. AI agents learn how to use it.
  4. AI agents build applications using it.
  5. More applications expose new requirements.
  6. The foundation improves.
  7. More developers and agents adopt it.

The foundation becomes more valuable precisely because AI makes it easier to build things on top of it.

Don't Build What AI Can Easily Assemble

This could become a useful rule for the next generation of Indian software engineers.

If an application can be assembled from ten mature open-source components in a few hours, building another copy of that application may not be the best long-term engineering opportunity.

Instead ask:

  • Which component is missing?
  • Which API is painful?
  • Which format has poor support?
  • Which low-level interface is unnecessarily difficult?
  • Which library is abandoned?
  • Which important project has poor documentation?
  • Which capability is repeatedly rebuilt by thousands of developers?
  • Which foundation could make an entire category of applications easier?

That is where the opportunity lies.

The Next Indian Software Story Could Be Deeper Than Services

India's first major software revolution was built around services.

The next could be built around products.

But there is potentially an even deeper stage:

infrastructure.

Not just SaaS products.

Not just mobile applications.

Not just AI wrappers.

Not just consulting.

But the underlying software that makes all of these things possible.

And as the AI era develops, the customer for this infrastructure will no longer be only a human developer.

It will increasingly be another piece of software.

An AI agent.

A coding agent.

A design agent.

A research agent.

A financial agent.

A manufacturing agent.

A scientific agent.

Millions of such agents may eventually need reliable software foundations.

From Software Services to Software Infrastructure

India should therefore think beyond the question:

"How many software engineers will AI replace?"

A much more productive question is:

"What foundations can Indian engineers build so that the next billion software systems can be created more easily?"

That is a completely different vision.

It does not require India to defeat Silicon Valley.

It does not require India to build the next giant consumer platform.

It does not require every engineer to become an AI researcher.

It requires something much more practical:

Build excellent software that other software can depend upon.

Start with the boring problems.

Make them reliable.

Document them obsessively.

Expose clean APIs.

Make them accessible from multiple languages.

Make them usable locally and offline where possible.

Make them friendly to automation.

Make them safe for agents.

Make them open where openness creates ecosystem value.

Then move deeper.

Into graphics.

Databases.

Networking.

Compilers.

Operating systems.

AI runtimes.

Hardware interfaces.

Open silicon.

This is not a retreat from the AI revolution.

It is a way of moving closer to its foundation.

The Opportunity Below the Application Layer

There will always be people who build applications.

There will always be people who design user experiences.

There will always be people who solve business problems.

But increasingly, AI will be able to perform more of the mechanical work involved in turning those requirements into software.

That makes the deeper layers more interesting.

The engineer who understands the machine, the operating system, the protocol, the file format, the compiler, the accelerator and the API can become the person who creates the abstraction that thousands of other engineers — and eventually millions of AI agents — use.

That is a fundamentally different position from selling another block of programming hours.

It is the difference between writing code for a project and building a piece of the digital infrastructure on which future projects will run.

India already has the people.

India already has the software culture.

India already has enormous experience operating at global scale.

What is needed is a stronger deliberate push downward — toward foundational software, open infrastructure, systems engineering and eventually hardware-software co-design.

The age of AI may reduce the value of writing repetitive code.

But it could dramatically increase the value of creating the foundations from which that code can be generated.

India should not merely become the world's largest consumer of AI coding agents.

It should help build the foundations those agents stand on.

That may be one of the most important software opportunities of the next decade.

Thursday, September 17, 2026

Build the Plinth Before the Statue: Why India Needs an Open Technology Consortium Now

India is building the foundations of a semiconductor industry. It is developing RISC-V capabilities, investing in electronics manufacturing and creating a growing deep-tech ecosystem. But a chip does not become a product simply because it comes out of a fab. Between silicon and the finished product lies an enormous layer of software, tools, drivers, APIs, standards and engineering knowledge. India should start building that layer now.

The Semiconductor Clock Is Not the Only Clock That Matters

India's semiconductor story is beginning to move from policy announcements toward physical infrastructure.

The Tata Electronics semiconductor fab in Gujarat, being established in partnership with Taiwan's Powerchip Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation (PSMC), has an approved investment of ₹91,526 crore and planned production capacity of approximately 50,000 wafer starts per month. India's semiconductor programme is also supporting OSAT facilities and a growing semiconductor-design ecosystem.

But there is another clock running in parallel.

The software clock.

A semiconductor fab can eventually produce chips. A design company can eventually produce a RISC-V processor. An NPU company can eventually produce an accelerator.

But when those chips arrive, someone has to make them useful.

Someone needs to make them boot.

Someone needs to write the drivers.

Someone needs to make Linux or an RTOS understand the hardware.

Someone needs to make the compiler generate good code.

Someone needs to make the GPU work.

Someone needs to make the NPU accessible to AI frameworks.

Someone needs to make cameras, displays, storage, Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, USB, sensors and power management work.

Someone needs to build the SDK.

Someone needs to test it.

Someone needs to document it.

Someone needs to maintain it five years later.

The time to begin doing that work is before the hardware arrives.

India should not wait for its semiconductor ecosystem to become mature before building the software ecosystem that makes that semiconductor ecosystem useful.

It should build the software ecosystem while the hardware ecosystem is still learning.

The Missing Institution

India already has companies, universities, semiconductor programmes, startups, open-source developers and individual RISC-V initiatives.

What is missing is a large institution whose primary purpose is to connect these efforts at the common infrastructure layer.

Call it, for now, the Indian Open Technology Consortium.

The name is less important than the function.

Its mission should be simple:

Build and maintain the open software, APIs, tools, reference implementations, testing infrastructure and standards required to make modern hardware easy to develop products on.

There is an important distinction in that sentence.

The consortium should not primarily make end-user products.

It should make the tools used to make end-user products.

Build the Plinth, Not Every Statue

Imagine a giant statue.

The statue is what everyone notices. It is the smartphone, automobile, robot, television, refrigerator, industrial machine or computer.

But underneath the statue is the plinth.

The plinth doesn't determine what the statue looks like. It gives the statue a stable foundation.

This is the role the consortium should play.

It should build the plinth.

A smartphone company can build its smartphone.

An automobile company can build its vehicle.

An appliance company can build its refrigerator.

A robotics startup can build its robot.

A semiconductor company can build its processor.

The consortium should make it easier for all of them to build.

That means standardising and maintaining the common layers that do not need to be reinvented by every company.

What Is the Common Layer?

Consider a smart washing machine.

The manufacturer may have proprietary algorithms for determining washing cycles, water consumption, detergent use, vibration and load characteristics.

Those are legitimate areas of differentiation.

But the machine also needs:

  • sensor interfaces
  • motor interfaces
  • networking
  • security
  • firmware updates
  • diagnostics
  • power management
  • storage
  • Bluetooth or Wi-Fi
  • device management

Why should every washing-machine company independently reinvent all of that?

Now consider a smart TV.

It needs:

  • GPU support
  • video decoding
  • audio
  • display drivers
  • HDMI
  • USB
  • networking
  • storage
  • security
  • OTA updates

Again, much of this is plumbing.

The same pattern appears in cars, smart watches, robot vacuums, industrial IoT devices, cameras, medical devices and smartphones.

The opportunity is to make the plumbing reusable.

Standardise the Interface, Not the Innovation

This is perhaps the most important design principle for the consortium.

It should not attempt to standardise the product.

It should standardise the interfaces between the components.

Imagine three different NPU manufacturers.

They have completely different internal architectures.

That is fine.

The application should be able to communicate with them through a common software interface.

                    AI APPLICATION
                          |
                    Common NPU API
                          |
                    AI Runtime
                          |
          +---------------+---------------+
          |               |               |
        NPU A           NPU B           NPU C
          |               |               |
       Vendor A        Vendor B        Vendor C

The same principle can apply to GPUs, cameras, displays, sensors, audio systems, storage, security engines and other hardware.

The consortium's job is not to tell semiconductor companies how to design their chips.

Its job is to ensure that software developers have a predictable way to use those chips.

That is how competition underneath an open interface becomes possible.

RISC-V Makes This Particularly Important

RISC-V is an open standard instruction-set architecture rather than a single processor design. RISC-V International describes its role as maintaining the open standard and related specifications, while implementations and software are developed by the wider ecosystem. The organisation explicitly describes interoperability and shared standards as mechanisms that allow different vendors to compete while building on a common foundation.

That distinction is critical.

RISC-V gives hardware designers freedom.

But freedom at the instruction-set level is only the beginning.

A commercially successful computing ecosystem still needs:

  • compilers
  • debuggers
  • bootloaders
  • operating systems
  • device drivers
  • graphics
  • AI runtimes
  • multimedia
  • security
  • networking
  • development tools
  • documentation
  • testing

This is why RISC-V should not be viewed simply as a processor project.

It is an ecosystem project.

Where Should the Consortium Start?

It should not start by designing a new operating system.

It should not start by building a new smartphone.

It should not start by designing another processor.

It should start with something much less glamorous.

Existing hardware.

There are already RISC-V development boards, SoCs, processors and accelerator projects available to developers.

The first task should be to map the ecosystem.

Which boards are available?

Which chips are supported?

Which peripherals work?

Which drivers are missing?

Which Linux subsystems require improvement?

Which RTOS implementations need support?

Where are the documentation gaps?

Which GPUs have usable open drivers?

Which NPUs have usable runtimes?

Which development boards are painful to bring up?

Which interfaces appear repeatedly across different chips?

That produces a list of actual engineering problems.

And those problems become the consortium's first projects.

Start With the Boring 80 Percent

The first engineering teams could concentrate on common interfaces:

  • GPIO
  • I²C
  • SPI
  • UART
  • PWM
  • ADC and DAC
  • USB
  • Ethernet
  • Wi-Fi
  • Bluetooth
  • SD and eMMC
  • NVMe
  • display interfaces
  • touchscreens
  • camera interfaces
  • audio
  • sensors
  • motor controllers
  • power-management ICs
  • watchdogs
  • real-time clocks
  • secure elements
  • hardware cryptography

These things are not glamorous.

That is precisely why they are valuable.

If five different RISC-V boards require the same kind of support, improving that support once can benefit all five.

If fifty future products can use the same API, the return on that engineering effort becomes enormous.

Then Move Up the Stack

Once the low-level foundation becomes stronger, the consortium can move upward:

LEVEL 1
Drivers / firmware / BSP
        |
LEVEL 2
Hardware abstraction
        |
LEVEL 3
Common APIs
        |
LEVEL 4
SDKs and developer tools
        |
LEVEL 5
Reference platforms
        |
LEVEL 6
Industry platforms
        |
LEVEL 7
Commercial products

The consortium should primarily operate through Levels 1–5.

Industry should dominate Levels 6 and 7.

That boundary is important.

If the consortium begins building commercial end-user products, it starts competing with the very companies it is supposed to enable.

Its purpose is to make those companies stronger.

The Steam Lesson

There is a useful analogy in the gaming world.

Valve's work around Steam on Linux demonstrates what can happen when a company invests heavily in the layers required to make a fragmented technical environment practical for mainstream users.

Proton/Wine, SDL, controller support, graphics compatibility, anti-cheat work, hardware integration and the wider Linux gaming ecosystem did not all originate as a single Valve-owned technology stack.

The important contribution was sustained engineering, integration, investment and upstream collaboration.

Valve didn't need to replace Linux.

It helped make Linux substantially more useful for a particular class of applications.

That is the lesson worth borrowing.

The Indian consortium should not attempt to replace the global open-source ecosystem.

It should make the global open-source ecosystem work exceptionally well with the hardware and industries India is trying to develop.

Do not fork the world. Strengthen the world.

India's First Objective Should Be Hardware Enablement

Imagine an Indian semiconductor company releases a new RISC-V SoC.

Today, the company may have to answer dozens of questions before an OEM can seriously consider it:

  • Does Linux boot?
  • Are the drivers upstream?
  • Does the GPU work?
  • Does the NPU have an SDK?
  • Can common AI frameworks use it?
  • Does video decoding work?
  • Does suspend/resume work?
  • How good is power management?
  • Does Wi-Fi work?
  • How do we perform secure OTA updates?
  • Where is the documentation?
  • Who maintains the software five years from now?

The consortium could turn a large part of that list into a platform service.

The semiconductor company could say:

"This chip is supported by the Open Technology Platform."

That changes the conversation.

The Consortium Becomes a Test Laboratory for Silicon

The organisation could establish shared hardware laboratories.

New chips could be tested against common workloads.

Measurements could include:

  • boot time
  • power consumption
  • thermal behaviour
  • memory bandwidth
  • GPU performance
  • NPU performance
  • video playback
  • browser performance
  • storage
  • networking
  • sleep and wake
  • security
  • driver maturity
  • application compatibility

This creates an unusually valuable feedback loop.

Software engineers learn what the silicon actually needs.

Silicon engineers learn what real software actually demands.

Future chips can then be designed with that knowledge.

It is a learning machine connecting software and hardware.

The Consortium Should Be Industry-Funded

The most sustainable model is unlikely to be a conventional government software programme.

The government can be an important enabler, but the consortium should ideally have substantial industry funding.

Potential members could include:

  • semiconductor companies
  • automobile manufacturers
  • electronics manufacturers
  • appliance manufacturers
  • telecommunications companies
  • cloud companies
  • IT companies
  • startups
  • universities
  • research institutions
  • multinational companies with significant engineering operations in India

The government could support the ecosystem through appropriate incentives, research programmes, infrastructure, procurement and university partnerships.

But the foundation should not become a government-owned software company.

A simple division of responsibility would be:

  • Government: create favourable conditions.
  • Industry: provide funding and engineering participation.
  • Universities: provide research and talent.
  • Foundation: provide infrastructure and stewardship.
  • Engineers: build and maintain the technology.
  • Open communities: retain technical authority.

Talent Before Headcount

One of the biggest mistakes would be to define the organisation's success by how many programmers it employs.

FLOSS requires a particular temperament.

Some engineers love the work of maintaining infrastructure for years.

They enjoy debugging obscure problems.

They enjoy reading specifications.

They enjoy reviewing patches.

They are willing to respond to upstream feedback.

They care about documentation and compatibility.

They enjoy understanding systems from silicon to application.

Those people are extraordinarily valuable.

The consortium should find them.

It should not try to force every software engineer into that role.

Start with talent and motivation, not headcount.

Perhaps the first engineering organisation has 100 people.

Perhaps later it becomes 500.

Perhaps eventually it becomes several thousand.

The growth should follow the work.

The Open Technology Academy

There should, however, be a deliberate path for new people to enter this ecosystem.

This is where a training and learning vertical becomes extremely valuable.

But it should not look like a conventional training institute.

It should be an Open Technology Academy.

Its purpose would be to turn interested engineers into contributors, developers, maintainers and eventually systems architects.

And the most important principle should be:

Don't teach people FLOSS. Put them inside FLOSS.

Learning by Contribution

Instead of spending months simply watching courses, an apprentice might receive a RISC-V development board.

The first assignment could be:

Make it boot.

Then:

Find something that doesn't work.

Then:

Debug it.

Then:

Fix it.

Then:

Submit the patch upstream.

Then:

Respond to the review.

Then:

Get it merged.

At that point the person hasn't merely completed a course.

They have become an open-source contributor.

A possible progression could be:

Explorer
   |
Contributor
   |
Developer
   |
Maintainer
   |
Senior Maintainer
   |
Technical Architect

Not everyone needs to reach the top.

Someone may discover that they love documentation.

Another may become an exceptional kernel developer.

Another may specialise in compiler technology.

Another may discover a talent for hardware validation.

Another may become a security engineer.

The Academy should help people discover where they belong.

Talent Should Select Itself

This also solves the problem of identifying people with the necessary drive.

Do not try to identify every future maintainer during recruitment.

Give interested people access to real projects.

Let contribution reveal the talent.

Perhaps 1,000 people enter an introductory programme.

Perhaps 300 become regular contributors.

Perhaps 100 become serious developers.

Perhaps 30 become excellent maintainers.

Perhaps five eventually become world-class subsystem experts.

That is not failure.

That is how a technical culture develops.

AI Makes Systems Engineering More Important

The emergence of increasingly capable AI coding tools makes this model even more interesting.

AI can increasingly help generate code, tests, documentation and debugging hypotheses.

But someone still needs to understand whether the resulting system is correct.

Does the driver break another subsystem?

Does the compiler produce incorrect machine code?

Does the firmware introduce a security vulnerability?

Does the NPU runtime actually exploit the hardware?

Does the power-management implementation work across different boards?

Can the software still be maintained five years later?

These are systems questions.

The consortium should therefore cultivate people who understand the complete chain:

silicon → firmware → kernel → driver → compiler → runtime → application.

That is a particularly valuable form of engineering knowledge.

India Should Not Keep the Consortium Indian

The institution may be founded and substantially funded in India.

But the technology should be globally open.

An engineer in Bengaluru should be able to work with an engineer in Munich.

A university in Chennai should be able to collaborate with a research group in Helsinki.

An Indian startup should be able to work with a European automotive company.

An engineer living in the United States, Japan, Brazil or Africa should be able to contribute to a project simply because they have something valuable to contribute.

Indian-origin engineers around the world could become an important source of talent, mentorship and leadership.

But nationality or ethnicity should not be a requirement for participation.

Indian-founded does not have to mean Indian-only.

Open by Default, Trusted by Design

This global openness must, however, coexist with serious security and compliance practices.

Not every project has the same risk.

A public compiler project and a secure automotive testing laboratory should not necessarily have identical access rules.

The consortium should therefore use a tiered participation model.

Open Community

Anyone can:

  • read the code
  • use the software
  • report bugs
  • submit patches
  • write documentation
  • participate in public projects

Technical Membership

Participating companies, universities and individuals can join working groups and contribute engineering resources under defined governance rules.

Strategic Membership

Trusted organisations can receive access to shared testing infrastructure, pre-production hardware, joint development programmes and industry working groups.

Restricted Projects

Projects involving particularly sensitive semiconductor designs, automotive systems, critical infrastructure, security technology or other controlled technologies can have additional access requirements.

The principle should be:

Open by default. Restricted where justified. Transparent about why.

Trust Should Be an Engineering Requirement

If India wants this consortium to become a major partner for Europe and other advanced technology ecosystems, trust cannot be an afterthought.

The consortium should establish a formal technology-trust framework covering areas such as:

  • ownership transparency
  • beneficial ownership
  • conflict-of-interest rules
  • export-control compliance
  • research-security procedures
  • secure development practices
  • software provenance
  • dependency tracking
  • vulnerability disclosure
  • access control
  • protection of sensitive hardware
  • auditable governance
  • transparent funding

The objective should not be to create arbitrary political exclusions.

It should be to create a predictable, auditable system in which partners understand the rules before they participate.

That is particularly important for cooperation with European organisations.

The EU and India are already deepening cooperation in semiconductors, high-performance computing, AI, quantum technologies and 6G through the EU–India Trade and Technology Council. The July 2026 TTC meeting also launched an EU–India deep-tech startup partnership and agreed to strengthen strategic value chains. This creates a natural environment in which a well-governed open technology institution could eventually become a useful India–Europe engineering bridge.

Europe Should Be a Partner, Not Just a Customer

Europe has substantial strengths in automotive systems, industrial automation, robotics, embedded technology, semiconductor equipment, power electronics and industrial software.

India has enormous engineering capacity, a large technology market, a growing semiconductor ecosystem and a large pool of software developers.

An open consortium could sit between these ecosystems.

Indian engineers could contribute maintainers.

European companies could contribute industrial requirements.

Universities could contribute research.

Semiconductor companies could contribute hardware.

Startups could turn the resulting infrastructure into products.

The output would remain open wherever the project licences and governance permit.

A driver written in India could eventually support equipment made in Europe.

A European robotics requirement could lead to an open API maintained by engineers in India.

A RISC-V development tool improved in Bengaluru could be used by developers everywhere.

That is what a genuinely global FLOSS ecosystem looks like.

Become a Serious Upstream Participant

The consortium should also participate deeply in the organisations that already maintain the world's open technology infrastructure.

That could include appropriate membership and engineering participation in organisations and communities around:

  • RISC-V
  • Linux
  • LLVM
  • Apache
  • Eclipse
  • OpenSSF
  • Mesa
  • Zephyr
  • other relevant FLOSS communities

But membership should not be about collecting logos.

Membership should mean contribution.

Money is useful.

Engineers are more useful.

Code is more useful.

Maintainers are more useful.

Testing infrastructure is more useful.

Upstream contributions are more useful.

RISC-V International's current development-partner model is an interesting example of this philosophy: participating organisations commit engineering resources and defined technical deliverables rather than merely being passive members.

India should adopt that mentality broadly.

Don't just join the global commons.

Become one of the people maintaining it.

Four Pillars

The consortium can therefore be organised around four major pillars.

1. Engineering & Maintenance

  • Linux
  • RISC-V
  • firmware
  • drivers
  • compilers
  • graphics
  • AI runtimes
  • security
  • embedded systems
  • testing

2. Open Technology Academy

  • apprenticeships
  • hardware labs
  • mentorship
  • upstream contribution
  • maintainer development
  • systems engineering

3. Industry & Ecosystem

  • semiconductors
  • automotive
  • consumer electronics
  • appliances
  • robotics
  • IoT
  • industrial systems
  • startups

4. Standards & Interoperability

  • APIs
  • reference architectures
  • compatibility specifications
  • certification
  • hardware profiles
  • security requirements
  • interoperability testing

These four pillars reinforce one another.

Industry provides real problems.

The engineers solve them.

The Academy creates new engineers.

The standards teams turn repeated solutions into reusable interfaces.

The FLOSS community improves everything.

The Five-Year Flywheel

The initial roadmap could be remarkably simple.

Year 1 — Discover

Inventory existing RISC-V hardware and identify the most common gaps.

Year 2 — Enable

Fix drivers, firmware, toolchains, documentation, testing and hardware support.

Year 3 — Standardise

Turn recurring solutions into common APIs, SDKs and reference platforms.

Year 4 — Industrialise

Build automotive, appliance, robotics, consumer-electronics and IoT working groups.

Year 5 — Export

Turn the Indian engineering base into a global contributor to open technology infrastructure.

The important thing is that the work can begin immediately.

It does not require waiting for a future Indian processor.

And Then the Silicon Arrives

When new Indian semiconductor products eventually become available, they should not enter an empty ecosystem.

They should enter an ecosystem that already knows how to support them.

                  INDIAN SILICON
                       |
                 RISC-V / SoC
                       |
                 Common BSP
                       |
              Linux / RTOS
                       |
              Drivers / HAL
                       |
             GPU / NPU / VPU
                       |
                 Common APIs
                       |
                    SDK
                       |
             Testing / Certification
                       |
                   STARTUPS
                       |
                    PRODUCTS
                       |
                    USERS

This is the entire reason to begin now.

The semiconductor industry has long development cycles.

Software can move faster.

India can use that difference in timescale to its advantage.

Don't Wait for the Perfect Chip

There is a dangerous temptation to say:

"Once India has a world-class processor, then we will build the ecosystem around it."

That is backwards.

The ecosystem should already exist when the processor arrives.

Developers should already know the tools.

Drivers should already have a place to live upstream.

Testing infrastructure should already exist.

SDKs should already be available.

AI frameworks should already have integration pathways.

Companies should already understand how to build products on open hardware.

Universities should already be teaching the relevant skills.

European and other international partners should already know the organisation.

The first commercial Indian chips should therefore become another supported platform rather than an entirely new software emergency.

The Real Product of the Consortium

At first glance, it might seem that the consortium's product is software.

That is only partly true.

Its deeper product is capability.

The capability to take a new processor and make it useful.

The capability to take a new NPU and integrate it with AI frameworks.

The capability to take a new GPU and bring it into the graphics stack.

The capability to take a new sensor and make it available through standard interfaces.

The capability to take a development board and turn it into a product platform.

The capability to train engineers who understand the entire stack.

The capability to maintain software for decades.

The capability to participate in global standards rather than merely consuming them.

That is technological sovereignty in a much more useful sense.

India Does Not Need to Build Everything

There is an important philosophical point here.

Technology sovereignty does not require India to manufacture every component, write every piece of software or create an Indian copy of every global product.

It means developing enough capability that India can understand, integrate, maintain, modify and improve the technologies on which its economy depends.

Open technology is particularly powerful for this purpose.

India can contribute to the global commons while simultaneously developing domestic capability.

A Linux contribution is both global software infrastructure and Indian engineering experience.

A RISC-V toolchain improvement is both global infrastructure and Indian semiconductor enablement.

A new NPU runtime is both a FLOSS contribution and a potential foundation for Indian AI hardware.

A compatibility test suite can be used by Indian manufacturers and foreign manufacturers alike.

Everyone benefits.

The Bigger Vision

Perhaps the most important thing is what this consortium should not become.

It should not become another government IT project.

It should not become a collection of proprietary products.

It should not become an Indian fork of the entire open-source world.

It should not become a jobs programme whose success is measured by headcount.

It should not become a standards bureaucracy detached from real hardware.

It should not build products that compete with the companies it is supposed to enable.

Instead:

Find the talent.

Give them real hardware.

Fix the plumbing.

Upstream the improvements.

Turn repeated solutions into APIs.

Build the tools.

Train through contribution.

Create trusted governance.

Work with Europe and the wider world.

Let startups and manufacturers build the products.

Build the Plinth Before the Statue

India's semiconductor journey will eventually produce silicon.

But silicon alone does not create an ecosystem.

The ecosystem emerges when hardware, software, developers, standards, manufacturers and users can work together.

That requires infrastructure.

Much of that infrastructure can be open.

Much of it can be shared.

Much of it can be built before the final products exist.

And much of it can be built today.

India does not need to wait for the perfect chip.

It can start with the chips and boards already available.

It can start with the missing drivers.

It can start with the broken documentation.

It can start with the APIs nobody has standardised yet.

It can start with the engineers who already have the drive to maintain difficult software.

It can start small and let success attract talent, companies and international partners.

Eventually, Indian-origin engineers around the world can participate.

European companies can become partners.

Universities can become training grounds.

Startups can become users of the infrastructure.

Semiconductor companies can become hardware partners.

And the resulting software can remain part of the global FLOSS commons.

The philosophy can be reduced to five principles:

  1. Build the tools, not every product.
  2. Standardise the interfaces, not the innovation.
  3. Train through contribution, not certificates.
  4. Be open by default and trusted by design.
  5. Build in India, contribute to the world.

The semiconductor fab may eventually produce the silicon.

But the software consortium can make sure that when that silicon arrives, someone already knows what to do with it.

That is the real opportunity.

Don't wait for the statue.

Build the plinth.

And make the plinth open enough that the world can build on it.

Friday, September 11, 2026

The Indian Computing Ecosystem: Own the Everyday, Rent the Extraordinary (Compressed)

Editor's Note: This is the compressed long-form edition of the original essay (https://thesovereignpulse.blogspot.com/2026/09/the-indian-computing-ecosystem-own.html) — shorter, but preserving the core argument and strategic framework behind India's emerging computing ecosystem.

India does not need to win the global transistor race to build computing sovereignty. It needs to own enough of the stack, enough of the market and enough of the learning curve.

The question is no longer whether India can build a computer

For decades, the obvious measure of computing progress has been the semiconductor process node.

7nm beats 14nm. 3nm beats 7nm. Eventually 2nm will beat 3nm, and some future process will beat that.

But national computing capability is not the same thing as transistor density.

A country can import the world's most advanced processors and still remain dependent on everyone else's architecture, software, intellectual property, manufacturing and supply chains.

Conversely, a country can build an ecosystem around mature silicon that is remarkably capable because the hardware, software and applications are designed together.

This is where India's semiconductor ambitions become much more interesting.

The Dholera semiconductor fab being developed by Tata Electronics, in partnership with PSMC, is planned as a 300mm foundry with technologies in the 28nm to 110nm range. Tata has also announced access to PSMC technologies including 28nm, 40nm, 55nm, 90nm and 110nm, while its 2026 partnership with ASML brings lithography expertise, equipment and ecosystem development into the picture. :contentReference[oaicite:1]{index=1}

That is not the end of India's computing journey.

It could be the beginning.

Stop confusing transistor size with user experience

The most important principle is simple:

A 22nm computer does not have to behave like a 22nm computer.

If the processor architecture is efficient, the operating system is optimised, the GPU and NPU handle the workloads they are designed for, memory is well matched to the system and applications are compiled specifically for the platform, a mature process can produce a very usable machine.

Users ultimately experience responsiveness, battery life, application performance and reliability.

They do not experience the transistor gate directly.

This creates a strategic opportunity.

India does not have to reproduce the entire global semiconductor hierarchy immediately. It can begin by owning the parts of computing that are economically and strategically important.

Generation One: build the computer before building the perfect computer

The first Indian processor does not need to be the fastest processor in the world.

It needs to exist.

A sensible first generation could be a modular laptop or desktop-class system built around a 40nm-class or similar mature process, with a RISC-V CPU, modest GPU or NPU acceleration, conventional memory and standard storage.

The objective would not be benchmark leadership.

The objective would be learning.

India needs engineers who understand the entire chain:

ISA → CPU → SoC → memory → accelerators → security → I/O → firmware → Linux → drivers → physical design → tapeout → packaging → product.

That knowledge cannot be acquired simply by importing finished chips.

The laptop should become a carrier for evolving silicon

This is where modular computing becomes particularly powerful.

Consider the philosophy behind systems such as MNT Reform: the motherboard, display, keyboard, storage and chassis can remain useful while the computing module evolves.

India could adopt the same principle.

+--------------------------------------------------+
|              Indian Modular Computer             |
+--------------------------------------------------+
| Display | Keyboard | Storage | Power | I/O       |
+--------------------------------------------------+
|              Standard Carrier Board              |
+--------------------------------------------------+
|       Replaceable Indian Compute Module          |
|     CPU + GPU/NPU + Memory + Security + I/O      |
+--------------------------------------------------+

The first compute module might be relatively modest.

The second could be faster.

The third could move to a smaller process.

The laptop does not have to become obsolete every time the processor improves.

That changes the economics of semiconductor development. Instead of treating every chip generation as a completely new ecosystem, India can build a platform on which successive generations of silicon are deployed.

The open-silicon advantage

India also does not have to start from an empty page.

The global open-hardware ecosystem already contains many of the building blocks.

RISC-V provides the open instruction-set architecture. Projects such as IIT Madras's SHAKTI demonstrate that India can build production-oriented RISC-V processors and SoCs. Other open projects cover CPUs, vector processors, GPUs, NPUs, image processing, storage controllers, security and SoC infrastructure.

Examples include SHAKTI, CVA6, BlackParrot, VexRiscv, Ara, Vortex, Coral NPU, NVDLA, Gemmini, Infinite-ISP, OpenTitan, LiteX and a growing collection of open ASIC design tools.

The significance is not that India should simply copy these projects.

The significance is that the starting point for Indian silicon can increasingly be a global design commons.

The missing piece is system integration.

Someone still has to turn all these components into a reliable product.

That is precisely where an Indian ecosystem can create enormous value.

Generation Two: optimisation becomes the weapon

Once the first generation exists, the objective changes.

The second generation does not need to reinvent everything. It can improve the CPU, memory subsystem, interconnect, accelerator blocks, power management and software stack.

A move toward 28nm-class silicon could provide substantially more room for integration.

Instead of building a generic processor and hoping the market finds a use for it, India could design processors around specific workloads:

  • government productivity
  • education
  • office computing
  • local AI inference
  • industrial automation
  • automotive systems
  • communications
  • edge computing
  • storage and networking

The competitive advantage would increasingly become optimisation.

That is a much more realistic target than attempting to defeat the world's leading semiconductor companies at every workload simultaneously.

Generation Three: the 22nm possibility

Further down the road, a 22nm-class platform becomes particularly interesting.

Technologies such as GlobalFoundries' 22FDX demonstrate that 22nm FD-SOI can combine relatively mature manufacturing with low-voltage operation, body biasing and integration of digital, analogue and RF capabilities.

For India, however, 22nm FD-SOI should be viewed as a future possibility rather than an assumption about Dholera's current process roadmap.

Moving to FD-SOI would require the appropriate substrates, process technology, PDKs, standard-cell libraries, SRAM, analogue IP, design tools, manufacturing expertise and qualification.

But if that capability eventually becomes available, it could provide an interesting middle ground.

The objective would not be to make a fake 1.4nm processor.

The objective would be to make a very good 22nm computer.

Own the everyday. Rent the extraordinary.

This leads to the larger economic strategy.

India does not need every citizen to own the world's fastest computer.

It needs a domestic computing platform capable of handling the overwhelming majority of everyday workloads.

Think of the ecosystem as three layers:

Tier Purpose Silicon Strategy
Everyday Government, education, business, home Indian-designed and increasingly Indian-manufactured
Premium Gaming, professional workloads, enthusiasts Open to the best global hardware
Extreme AI training, HPC, scientific computing Accessed primarily through data centres and cloud infrastructure

This is not technological isolation.

It is sovereignty through optionality.

An Indian citizen should be able to buy an Indian computer because it is good enough, affordable and supported—not because every foreign alternative has been banned.

If someone wants a premium NVIDIA GPU, Apple processor or other leading-edge system, that market can remain open.

If a research institution needs enormous AI compute, it can rent it from a data centre using whatever advanced global silicon is economically appropriate.

The important thing is that the entire country does not need to depend on imported leading-edge silicon for ordinary computing.

The government can provide the anchor market

One of the biggest problems in semiconductor development is the chicken-and-egg problem.

Chip companies need customers before they can scale.

Customers hesitate to adopt immature domestic chips before the ecosystem is proven.

Government procurement can break that loop.

Imagine, as a policy scenario rather than a current mandate, that government departments and government-supported institutions committed to using a substantial proportion of domestically designed computing hardware.

A 20-million-device planning scenario would already be transformative.

At an illustrative ₹50,000 per machine, that represents ₹1 trillion, or ₹1 lakh crore, of hardware demand over a replacement cycle.

The real value, however, would be larger than the initial purchase.

Every government laptop becomes a test platform.

Every deployment creates software feedback.

Every failure teaches an engineer something.

Every successful deployment creates confidence for the private sector.

And the users take the technology home.

A government employee using an Indian computer at work is one user. A family exposed to that machine can represent several more potential users.

The government therefore does not have to manufacture everything.

It can create the initial market that allows domestic manufacturers and software developers to learn at scale.

Software is where the ecosystem compounds

Hardware sovereignty without software sovereignty would leave India only partially independent.

This is why the operating system matters.

Ubuntu and the wider Linux ecosystem already provide an enormous foundation for RISC-V computing. Over time, India could build a stronger national platform layer on top of Linux—possibly through a dedicated initiative or commercial ecosystem.

Call the hypothetical concept Canonical India.

The point would not be to create another Linux distribution merely for branding.

The point would be to coordinate the hardware and software stack:

  • RISC-V support
  • CPU-specific optimisation
  • GPU and NPU drivers
  • power management
  • security
  • developer tools
  • package repositories
  • enterprise support
  • long-term updates

And the argument should not be that Android is simply a "virtualised" operating system. Android's ART runtime uses both ahead-of-time and just-in-time compilation, and Android supports native code through the NDK.

The stronger argument is that a native Linux/RISC-V platform gives India greater freedom to optimise the entire stack—from compiler to CPU to accelerator to application.

That is a much more powerful proposition.

The smartphone is the harder battlefield

Mobile computing would eventually become an obvious target.

A 22nm-class Indian mobile platform would not need to outperform the latest flagship processor.

It would need to deliver excellent everyday performance at a competitive cost.

Office applications, messaging, web browsing, media playback, education, payments and local AI inference do not necessarily require the world's smallest transistor.

The difficult part would be the ecosystem around the processor.

Cellular modems, RF, graphics, camera pipelines, display interfaces, power management and certification are all substantial engineering challenges.

Some of these technologies could remain globally sourced while the central compute platform becomes progressively more Indian.

Again, the principle is optionality rather than isolation.

Data centres complete the pyramid

The same ecosystem can support a completely different class of computing at the top.

                 EXTREME COMPUTE
             AI / HPC / SCIENCE
          Advanced Global Silicon
                    ▲
                    │
                 CLOUD
                    ▲
                    │
        INDIAN EVERYDAY COMPUTING
       Laptops / Desktops / Phones
            Domestic Platform

The ordinary device does not have to perform every computation locally.

A modest Indian laptop can run normal workloads while sending demanding AI, simulation or rendering tasks to a domestic data centre.

Those data centres can use whatever processors make economic sense—including advanced foreign silicon.

This is the key insight.

India does not need to own every transistor. It needs to own the ability to choose where computation happens.

Why ASML and the Netherlands matter

Semiconductor sovereignty cannot mean pretending the global semiconductor industry does not exist.

It means building strategic relationships with it.

The Tata Electronics-ASML partnership is significant in precisely this context. ASML is supporting the Dholera fab with lithography technology, training, supply-chain development and R&D infrastructure. :contentReference[oaicite:2]{index=2}

India can therefore learn from the world's semiconductor ecosystem while simultaneously building its own capabilities.

The long-term objective should be a design loop:

global technology → Indian engineering → Indian design → Indian manufacturing → Indian products → Indian users → engineering feedback → better Indian technology.

Over time, the proportion of that loop controlled domestically can increase.

The first generation creates the engineers who build the second

This may ultimately be the most important point.

The first Indian computer is not merely a product.

It is an engineering school.

The engineers who build the first RISC-V SoC learn things that cannot be learned from PowerPoint presentations.

They learn timing closure.

They learn memory controllers.

They learn power budgets.

They learn packaging.

They learn what breaks after tapeout.

They learn how Linux behaves on their silicon.

They learn what customers actually need.

Then they build the second generation.

And the third generation is built by engineers who grew up inside the second.

That is how ecosystems become self-reinforcing.

The ultimate roadmap

Stage Objective
1 Open RISC-V development platforms
2 First Indian SoCs and learning silicon
3 Modular domestic computer platforms
4 Commercial 40nm-class systems
5 28nm-class higher-performance platforms
6 Integrated CPU, GPU and NPU ecosystems
7 Potential 22nm-class advanced domestic silicon
8 Thin-and-light mainstream computers
9 Indian mobile and edge-computing platforms
10 Advanced domestic data-centre accelerators

None of these stages needs to happen overnight.

The point is to make sure that every stage creates the capabilities required for the next.

Dholera should become more than a fab

The real opportunity is therefore much larger than manufacturing wafers.

Dholera could become the physical anchor of an Indian computing ecosystem—but only if the surrounding ecosystem grows with it.

That means semiconductor design.

It means RISC-V processors.

It means accelerators.

It means open-source hardware.

It means EDA and physical-design expertise.

It means packaging.

It means firmware and drivers.

It means Linux.

It means laptops, desktops, phones, servers and embedded systems.

And above all, it means users.

Conclusion: India does not have to win the transistor race

The conventional semiconductor race asks a simple question:

Who can manufacture the smallest transistor?

India should ask a different question:

How much of the computing experience can we control?

If India can build open processors, domestic SoCs, accelerators, operating systems, developer tools, computers and eventually mobile platforms, then a mature process node becomes much more powerful than its number suggests.

A 22nm machine optimised across the hardware and software stack can be an excellent everyday computer.

A premium user can still buy the world's fastest foreign machine.

A researcher can still rent extreme compute from a data centre.

And the domestic ecosystem can continue improving underneath all three.

That is the real meaning of “Own the Everyday, Rent the Extraordinary.”

India does not need to isolate itself from the global semiconductor industry.

It needs to become capable of participating in it from a position of strength.

The ultimate objective is not one Indian chip.

It is an Indian computing ecosystem.

Own the everyday. Rent the extraordinary. Keep the silicon evolving. And never start from zero again.

Tuesday, September 1, 2026

The Trust Ceiling: Why China's Software Hits a Wall the World Can See

A Strategic Essay on India's Convergence Opportunity, 2026–2040


The Question That Refused to Be Answered

It started with a simple question, the kind that should be bread and butter for any AI model claiming to reason about the world: What changed in China after the 1990s that catapulted it well beyond India, even though both countries adopted similar market-opening policies within five to ten years of each other?

DeepSeek—a technically impressive model built by a Chinese company, one that matches or beats Western frontier models on reasoning benchmarks—refused to answer. "Beyond my scope," it said. The same question, asked of Indus, the in-house model built by Sarvam AI in India, answered freely and substantively.

This is not a story about model capability. DeepSeek's underlying architecture can almost certainly reason about comparative economics; it is trained on vast academic literature on exactly this topic. What it cannot do is output that reasoning when the question brushes against the Chinese state's content boundaries. Comparative political systems? Sensitive. Post-1949 historical analysis? Sensitive. Evaluating governance effectiveness? Sensitive. The filter trips, and the model falls silent.

A model that cannot answer a straightforward comparative-economics question is not a model the world will rely on for reasoning. It is a model that works inside a wall.

That wall has a name. Let's call it the Trust Ceiling.


The Trust Ceiling, Defined

The Trust Ceiling is the upper limit on global adoption of a country's information-technology products, imposed not by technical capability but by the perceived reliability, integrity, and independence of those products. It is the point where a user—whether a teenager in São Paulo, a procurement officer in Berlin, or an enterprise CIO in Dallas—asks: Will this thing lie to me? Will it withhold information? Could my data end up somewhere I don't want it?

When the answer is "maybe," adoption stalls. Not because the product is bad, but because the trust isn't there. And trust, in information-centric products, is the product.

This is the structural constraint that Chinese software now faces globally, and it is a constraint of the state's own making. It is also—Pulse, this is the heart of what follows—the single largest structural opening for India in the next ten to fifteen years.


The Paradox of Chinese Software: Capable Products, Capped Adoption

The instinct to dismiss Chinese software globally is wrong, and we should be precise about why. Chinese software does not lack capability. Tencent, Alibaba, ByteDance, Kingsoft, and Huawei have built platforms with massive scale, genuine engineering sophistication, and features that rival or exceed Western competitors.

And in certain categories, Chinese software has achieved spectacular global success.

TikTok has roughly 1.6 billion users worldwide and was the most-downloaded app on the planet for years. CapCut, its video-editing sibling, dominates short-form content creation globally. Temu and Shein are rewriting e-commerce in the United States and Europe. PUBG Mobile has hundreds of millions of players. Genshin Impact, made by miHoYo in Shanghai, is one of the highest-grossing games in the world. Xiaomi's MIUI software layer runs on phones across India, Southeast Asia, and Europe.

So the claim that "Chinese software can't break through globally" is factually wrong. It has, repeatedly and massively. But—and this is the critical distinction—it breaks through in categories where the product's value does not depend on trust, truth, or information sensitivity.

A dance app doesn't require you to trust the company's honesty. A cheap dress doesn't ask whether the platform will withhold information from you. A mobile game doesn't care about data residency. These products sail through the Trust Ceiling because they never hit it.

But now look at the categories where Chinese software hasn't broken through globally, or has hit walls:

AI assistants. DeepSeek, Qwen, and ERNIE are technically capable models. But every one of them operates under content filters that restrict what they can say about politics, history, and governance. For a global user who wants an AI assistant that reasons freely, that is an immediate and non-negotiable dealbreaker. The product is fine. The ceiling is the muzzle.

Productivity software. WPS Office, made by Kingsoft, has roughly 500 million users—a number that sounds impressive until you examine how it was built. A large portion of that distribution comes from pre-installation on Xiaomi, Redmi, and Huawei devices. Xiaomi and Kingsoft have an active co-development partnership; they've built "PC-level WPS" experiences specifically for Xiaomi tablets and phones. This isn't organic software preference—it's device-shipment bundling. Take away the hardware distribution and the user count tells a very different story. More importantly, global enterprise buyers hesitate to put their business documents in a Chinese office suite, because Chinese national security laws compel companies to assist state intelligence work. The Trust Ceiling caps the enterprise market.

Search and communication. Baidu has negligible global market share outside China. WeChat is a walled garden used primarily by the Chinese diaspora. No Chinese communication platform has become a global default, because communication platforms require maximum trust, and the state's shadow is heaviest exactly there.

The pattern is unmistakable: Chinese software succeeds globally when trust is irrelevant, and stalls when trust is essential. The Trust Ceiling is not a theory. It is an observable, repeating, structural outcome.


The Anatomy of the Ceiling

Three mechanisms hold the Trust Ceiling in place. Understanding them precisely matters, because India's opportunity sits in the gap between each one.

1. The Content Filter

Chinese AI models, by law and by regulatory pressure, must filter their outputs on politically sensitive topics. This is not a technical limitation—it is a regulatory muzzle bolted onto otherwise capable systems. Researchers have systematically tested Chinese LLMs (DeepSeek, Qwen, ERNIE) and found consistent differences in how they handle China-adjacent political topics compared to Western or Indian models: they refuse, give sanitized official-framing answers, or redirect.

For a user anywhere in the world, the experience is jarring. You ask a straightforward question and the model says "beyond my scope." You rephrase; it still dodges. You compare with a Western or Indian model that answers the same question substantively. The conclusion writes itself: this tool cannot be trusted to give me honest information on topics that matter.

The content filter is the most visible mechanism, but it is also the most fixable from China's perspective—technically. Remove the filter, and DeepSeek's reasoning is genuinely strong. But the filter exists for a political reason, and the Chinese state will not remove it. That is the paradox: the thing that makes Chinese AI globally uncompetitive is the thing the state will not sacrifice.

2. The Data Sovereignty Shadow

China's National Intelligence Law (2017) requires Chinese organizations and citizens to "support, assist, and cooperate with national intelligence efforts." This is not a vague suggestion; it is a legal obligation. For any Chinese software product handling user data abroad—office suites, cloud storage, communication tools, AI assistants—the question is not whether the company would hand over data if asked, but whether it legally could refuse. It cannot.

This creates a permanent trust deficit. It is why TikTok faced bans or forced divestiture in the United States. It is why Huawei was excluded from 5G networks across the Five Eyes and much of Europe. It is why there is growing scrutiny of Chinese electric vehicles and their data-collection systems in the EU. The pattern is consistent: once a product handles data that matters to national security or individual privacy, Chinese origin becomes a disqualifying factor, regardless of the product's quality.

3. The Coercion Invisibility Problem

The deepest mechanism is the one you can't see. The Trust Ceiling isn't just about what Chinese software does do—it's about what global users fear it might do. Even if a Chinese AI model were genuinely uncensored tomorrow, the structural relationship between Chinese tech companies and the Chinese state means users would still wonder. Is the model subtly biased? Are certain topics quietly down-ranked? Is my data being routed somewhere?

This is the coercion invisibility problem: you cannot prove a negative. You cannot prove the software isn't compromised. And in the absence of proof, trust defaults to suspicion. The state's tight embrace of its tech sector—capital allocations, strategic guidance, the "civil-military fusion" doctrine—means the suspicion is rational, not paranoid.


The Indian Asymmetry

Now consider India's position. Indus, built by Sarvam AI, answered the comparative-economics question that DeepSeek refused. Not because Indus is more capable—it isn't, not yet—but because India does not impose equivalent content restrictions on AI models. India's regulatory environment for AI is currently light-touch. There is no expansive content-filtering mandate, no national intelligence law compelling data handover, no civil-military fusion doctrine that treats every tech company as a state asset.

This is a structural advantage, not a coincidental one. And it matters more than it might seem at first.

The global software market is increasingly bifurcating along trust lines. As Western governments, enterprises, and consumers grow wary of Chinese-origin information technology, they are actively looking for alternatives. The United States has banned TikTok on government devices. The EU is tightening its scrutiny of Chinese technology under the Digital Markets Act and the Cyber Resilience Act. Enterprise procurement policies increasingly include "trusted vendor" requirements that effectively screen out Chinese-origin software for sensitive use cases.

India sits in a genuinely unique position. It has the engineering talent, the English-language fluency, the democratic institutions, and—critically—the regulatory restraint to be the trusted alternative. An Indian AI model that answers freely, an Indian office suite that doesn't operate under a national intelligence law, an Indian cloud platform subject to transparent legal processes—these are not marginal advantages. In a world sorting itself by trust, they are category-defining advantages.

But—and this is the qualification that must be stated plainly—the advantage is not permanent. It exists today, and it exists because India has chosen restraint. India has its own sensitivities: communal topics, Kashmir, certain historical events. IT rules have been tightening. There is a real temptation, in the name of national security or social harmony, to impose Chinese-style content restrictions on Indian platforms. If India walks that path, it will build its own Trust Ceiling—and the structural advantage evaporates.

The lesson from China's experience is precise: you cannot control information at home and expect to be trusted with information abroad. The two are inseparable. India's software opportunity depends on not learning the wrong lesson from China's rise.


The Physical Convergence: Where Software Meets Manufacturing

Here is where the argument deepens beyond software alone.

Physical products are becoming information products. A modern electric vehicle is a computer on wheels. A smart factory is a data-processing facility that happens to produce goods. A logistics network is a software platform that moves atoms instead of bytes. The boundary between "hardware" and "software" has dissolved—what exists now is integrated systems where the value sits in the data layer, the intelligence layer, and the connectivity layer layered over physical infrastructure.

This convergence is the goldmine you're sensing, Pulse. Because if Chinese software hits a Trust Ceiling, and physical products are increasingly software-defined, then Chinese hardware will increasingly inherit the trust problem of Chinese software.

We are already seeing it. Chinese EVs face scrutiny in the EU over their data-collection capabilities. Chinese telecom equipment is banned in multiple countries. Chinese drones—market-leading in capability—face restrictions in the US and allied markets because of concerns about data transmission. As more physical products become data-collection and data-processing platforms, the Trust Ceiling descends over more and more of Chinese manufacturing.

The scope of this is staggering. If trust becomes a procurement criterion for everything from factory automation systems to smart-grid infrastructure to connected appliances, then the "China+1" supply chain diversification that began as a tariff and geopolitical story becomes a trust and data sovereignty story. Companies won't diversify away from China only because it's cheaper or geopolitically safer—they'll diversify because their customers demand trusted products, and trusted products cannot be built entirely on a Chinese software stack.

This is where India's dual positioning becomes strategically potent: a software environment that the world can trust, and a manufacturing base that the world needs. The two reinforce each other. India doesn't just offer cheaper factories—it offers factories whose software layer doesn't come with a state-intelligence backdoor. In a world of connected products, that's not a niche. It's the entire value proposition.


The IMEC Variable

This is where IMEC—the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor—enters the frame, not as a logistics project but as a strategic trust architecture.

IMEC was launched at the G20 Summit in New Delhi in September 2023. It envisions a multimodal network—rail, sea ports, energy grids, and fiber-optic data cables—connecting India to the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Israel, and onward to Europe. Its stated goals include reducing shipping times by up to 40% compared to the Suez route, strengthening supply chain resilience, and creating an alternative to China's Belt and Road Initiative.

But the deeper logic of IMEC isn't just about moving boxes faster. It's about creating a trusted corridor for trade, energy, and data that connects democratic, rules-based economies while bypassing infrastructure dominated by a single authoritarian state.

Consider what IMEC actually connects. On one end: India, a democracy of 1.4 billion people with a growing manufacturing base and a trusted software environment. In the middle: the UAE and Saudi Arabia, investing hundreds of billions in economic transformation and actively seeking non-Chinese technology partners. On the other end: the European Union, which has broken its energy relationship with Russia, is urgently recalibrating away from Chinese supply chains, and has committed to concrete steps for IMEC's realization. And underpinning it all: the United States, which under both the Biden and Trump administrations has championed IMEC as a strategic priority—President Trump calling it "one of the greatest trade routes in all of history."

The EU-India free trade agreement, if implemented, is projected to boost bilateral trade by 41 to 65 percent. A large portion of that trade could flow through IMEC. France, Italy, and Greece are actively competing to be the European gateway port—Marseille, Trieste, Piraeus. The political will is real.

But here is the part that connects to the Trust Ceiling argument: IMEC isn't just a trade route for goods. It includes a digital pillar—subsea and terrestrial fiber-optic cables linking emerging data centers in the Middle East with Europe and India. This is a trusted data corridor that bypasses Chinese-controlled infrastructure. In a world where data sovereignty is becoming a first-order national security concern, a fiber-optic link from Indian data centers to European enterprise customers—running through partner nations, not adversarial ones—is a strategic asset of enormous value.

And it includes an energy pillar—electricity grid interconnection and potential green hydrogen pipelines. Energy security and data security, woven together through the same geographic corridor. This is not just trade facilitation. It is the architecture of a trust bloc.


The Hard Reality Check

It would be intellectually dishonest to present this as a guaranteed ascent. The opportunity is real, but so are the obstacles, and Pulse, you know the difference between opportunity and execution is where most nations fail.

IMEC is years from operational

As of 2026, there are "no firm funding commitments or construction timelines" for the full corridor. The transportation pillar has a financing gap of approximately $5 billion just to become minimally operational. The critical missing link—the railway from Jordan into Israel—does not exist and has seen no progress in 25 years. Saudi Arabia has committed $20 billion, but broader investment remains unclear. The India-UAE segment is the furthest along, with a virtual trade corridor already launched. That is the realistic near-term win. The full corridor to Europe via Israel is the ambitious, uncertain part.

The Middle East is volatile

IMEC was announced weeks before October 7, 2023. The Gaza war strained the Israel-Gulf normalization that IMEC depends on. The 2026 conflict with Iran further called the Gulf logistics thesis into question. Türkiye has explicitly opposed IMEC because it would be bypassed and has leverage through Syria. The corridor runs through some of the most volatile geography on earth. Political risk is not a side note—it is a core variable.

India's manufacturing gap

India's container production capacity is 30,000 units versus China's 3 million. This is a 100x structural deficit in the physical infrastructure of trade. India has established a ₹2,500 crore maritime development fund and is targeting smaller vessels—a smart niche—but closing a gap of this magnitude takes decades, not years. Without the physical infrastructure to move goods at scale, the Trust Ceiling advantage in software remains a software story, not a national economic story.

The restraint must be maintained

India's software advantage exists because of regulatory restraint. If India tightens its own IT rules, expands surveillance mandates, or imposes content restrictions on AI models in the name of national security or social harmony, it will build its own Trust Ceiling. The advantage is not permanent—it is a choice that must be continuously made. And the temptation to make the wrong choice will only grow as India's geopolitical competition with China intensifies.

The talent must deepen

India's engineering talent is real but not deep enough. The 2025-26 Economic Survey shows R&D expenditure stagnant at 0.64 percent of GDP—far below China's 2.4 percent and the global average. Without translating research into scalable intellectual property, India remains a consumer of others' technology, not a producer. The Trust Ceiling advantage creates the demand for Indian software; it does not automatically create the supply of world-class Indian software. That requires investment, education reform, and a genuine innovation culture—none of which are guaranteed.


The Convergence Window: 2026–2040

Let me now state the thesis directly, Pulse, in the way your blog frames things.

India's strategic opportunity over the next 10 to 15 years sits at the convergence of three forces, each of which is independently powerful and which, together, create a compound opening unlike anything India has faced since 1947.

Force One: The Trust Ceiling over Chinese software. As information technology becomes more central to every economic activity, and as global users become more sensitive to data sovereignty and information integrity, Chinese-origin software faces a structural limit it cannot break through without political liberalization that the state will not permit. This creates a growing demand for trusted alternatives in AI, enterprise software, cloud infrastructure, and communication platforms.

Force Two: The trust descent over Chinese hardware. As physical products become software-defined—connected vehicles, smart factories, IoT infrastructure, smart grids—the Trust Ceiling over Chinese software descends over Chinese hardware. Products that were once judged on cost and quality are increasingly judged on data trustworthiness. This widens the "China+1" story from tariff avoidance to trust compliance, and it expands the categories of manufacturing that will seek non-Chinese alternatives.

Force Three: IMEC as the trusted corridor. If IMEC progresses—even partially, even in its India-UAE-Gulf segment first—it creates the physical and digital infrastructure linking Indian manufacturing and software to European demand, running through partner nations rather than adversarial ones. The EU-India FTA, if concluded, amplifies this. The digital and energy pillars of IMEC create not just trade routes but trust corridors—geographic zones of trusted data and energy flow.

The convergence is the point. Each force alone is meaningful. Together, they create a compound opportunity: India as the trusted provider of both the software intelligence layer and the physical manufacturing base for a world that is sorting itself along trust lines.

This is not a prediction. It is a description of a structural opening. Whether India walks through it depends on execution—on manufacturing scale, infrastructure, logistics, education, R&D investment, and, above all, on the political wisdom to maintain the regulatory restraint that creates the trust advantage in the first place.


What the Next Decade Demands

The Trust Ceiling is China's ceiling. It is also India's mirror. What we do with it—whether we build a trusted software-and-manufacturing economy or merely sell the narrative of one while quietly building our own walls—will define the next fifteen years.

The DeepSeek moment—where a capable model refused to answer a question that an Indian model answered freely—is not an anecdote. It is a signal. It tells you where Chinese software will always hit a wall, and it tells you where India's opening sits. The model that answers freely is the model the world will use. The nation that builds without a muzzle is the nation the world will trust.

The 2010s were defined by code. The 2020s are being defined by trust. The question for India is whether we recognize that before the window closes—or whether we spend the next decade building walls of our own and calling them sovereignty.